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The frequent application of antidumping and  control for differences across industries and
countervailing measures in the United States in  separately measure the effects of duties and
the 1980s has been described as a new foi-m  of  investigations.
protection.
The results suggest that for some sectors the
Harrison measures the effect not only of  price effect of investigations is as great as
investigations (to evaluate claims of dumping or  imposing a duty.  Investigations that end in
subsidies) but of the resulting duties, by measur-  duties have different effects tham  those resulting
ing their impact on import prices.  in no action.
The dataset combines cross-section and time
series data for 1981-86, making it possible to
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Several  rounds  of trade  negotiations  over the last three decades  have
reduced  the  level  of tariffs  in the  United  States  to an average  of 6 percent.
At  the same time, however, ceilings on tariffs have been accompanied  by
significant  increases  in  non-tariff  measures. Although  some  of these  forms  of
protection,  such  as  quotas  or  voluntary  export  restraints,  have  clearly  affected
steel  and  autos,  'Less  is  known  about  the  effects  of  other,  increasingly  popular
non-tariff  measures:  anti-dumping  and  countervailing  investigations  and  duties.
Despite  theoretical  arguments  by Prussa  (1988),  Dixit (1988),  and Staiger  and
Wolak (1990),  the impact  of these  measures  on import prices is not well
understood.'
Countervailing  and anti-dumping  measures  are generally  referred to as
"less-than-fair-value"  (LFV)  cases,  where  a foreign  exporter  to US markets  is
accused  of setting  the  export  price  belvw its fair  value. The fair value is
usually  determined  to  be either  the  home  market  price  (as  in  a dumping  case)  or
a constructed  price  net of subsidies  (as  in a countervailing  duty case).  LFV
cases  are assessed  through  investigations  by the  US government,  followed  by a
duty if the foreign firm is indeed found guilty of dumping or receiving
subsidies.
Are  these  measures  a  new  form  of  protection?  None  of  the  previous  studies
on LFV cases have measured their !%pact  on import  prices. 2  Herander and
1 For  an  overview  of the  stylized  facts  on antidumping  legisi  ation  and  its
effects  in the  European  Community,  see  Messerlin  (1989).
2 See,  for  example,  Finger  (1981),  Herander  and  Schwartz  (1986),  Hartigan,
Perry  and  Kamma  (1989),  Salvatore  (1987),  Leamer  (1989),  and  Messerlin  (1989)).
1Schwartz  (1986),  using  data  for  1976-81,  found  that  dumping  margins  of  individual
firms  declined  following  the initiation  of an investigation.  However,  they  did
not  attempt  to test  whether  investigations  increased  overall  import  prices  for
the affected industry.  Nor have previous studies compared the  impact of
investigations  with the duties  which may (or may not) follow.  To properly
measure  these  effects  separately  would require  a tiime  series  on the affected
product. 3 Finally,  there  have  been  no attempts  to  measure  the  different  impact
of  investigations  conditional  on their outcomes. Do  investigations  which
terminate  in  a  duty  have  a  greater  effect  than  others? Prussa  (1988)  and  Staiger
and Wolak (1990)  suggest  that investigations  which  do not culminate  in duties
may actually  lead to higher  price increases  than duties.  Since  petitions  for
investigations  may be withdrawn,  collusive agreements  between domestic and
foreign  firms  may lead  to  hig:-er  prices  even if  no duties  are imposed.
This paper addresses  these empirical  questions  using a dataset which
combines  cross  section  and time  series  data  to create  a panel  for  41 different
product  groups  over  1981-1986.  LFV  cases  were  brought  against  half the  products,
creating  a control  group  for  comparison.  The time  series  nature  of the  dataset
also  makes  it  possible  to  separately  estimate  the  effects  of investigations  and
duties.  The  results  suggest  )hat  for  a  number  of  sectors,  import  prices  increase
by as  much  as 10  percent  dui:.g  an _nvestigation--suggesting  that  investigating
an  exporter  for  unfair  pricing  behavior  may  I ave  as  powerful  -in  effect  on import
prices  as the  duty itself.
3  One interesting  approach  to this problem  is taken  by Hartigan  et al
(1989)  who  use  a time  series  of  firm  stock  prices  to  measure  the  impact  of  anti-
dumping  investigations  and  duties  on the  reported  stock  value  of  domestic  firms
involved  in  anti-dumping  or  countervailing  duty  complaints.  However,  the  impact
of  anti-dumping  investigations  and  duties  cannot  be separated  in  their  analysis,
since  the combined  effect  of the  two is immediately  incorporated  in the stock
value  of the  domestic  firm.
2Another  interesting  stylized  fact  which  emerges  is that  pricing  behavior
differs depending  on the outcome  of the investigation.  Across all types of
industries,  investigations  which  did  not result  in duties  had  no statistically
significant  effect  on import  prices.  Investigations  which did lead to duties,
however,  were associated  with  either  significant  increases  in import  prices  or
significant  declines.  These  results  suggest  that in some cases,  the expected
duties  are incorporated  in import  prices  during the investigation.  In other
cases,  however,  it appears  that  duties  are imposed  following  a period  of low
prices  observed  during  the investigation.
The  theoretical  and  institutional  framework  is  presented  in  Section
II.  We show  why  the  threat  of a  duty  is  sufficient  to  induce  firms  to  raise  their
prices.  Section  III  describes  the  dataset  and  estimation  procedure.  The  results
are  presented  in Section  IV.
II.  Theoretical  and Institutional  Framework
It is impossible  to understand  why firms  would  be induced  to raise  prices
when they  are subject  to an investigation  without  a clear  understanding  of the
institutional framework. 4  Since  the  procedure  for  anti-dumping and
countervailing duty  claims  are  very  similar, we  will  refer  to  them
interchangeably.  A  LFV case is first initiated  by either the Secretary  of
Commerce or  an  "interested  party".  The  interested  party  is usually a
representative  for  domestic  manufacturers  of the  competing  imported  product,  a
4 See Section  19 by Wendy  Takacs  and Section  21 by Morton Pomeranz  in
Handbook  of International  Business,  Tracy  Murray  and  Ingo  Walter,  editors,  1987.
3union,  or a trade  association  of domestic  producers.  Within  a designated  time
period,  the Commerce  Department  must reach  a preliminary  determination  about
whether  the  foreign  firm  is guilty  of  dumping  (or  receiving  subsidies). If the
pre lminary  determination  is  positive,  then the  importing irm  must provide  a
deposit  equal  to  the  subsidy  or dumping  margin  for  all its  imports  into  the  US.
After the  preliminary  decision,  the  Commerce  Department  has an additional
period  to reach  a final  determit.ation.  If the  determination  is positive,  the
International  Trade  Commission  (ITC)  must  then  decide  within  a  designated  period
whether the product is causing or threatens  ta cause "material  injury" (ie
substantial  harm) to US firms.  If the determination  is negative,  the foreign
exporter is refunded the deposit. If, however, the final determination  is
positive,  then  the firm  must continue  to make cash  payments  on its  exports  of
an amount  equal to the dumping  margin  or the subsidy.  For both dumping and
countervailing  cases, in "critical circumstances"  duties may be  imposed
retroactively  to the beginning  of the investigation.  In the case of dumping
duties, the process may be suspended  if an agreement is reached with the
offending  exporters  to  eliminate  dumping.  Unfortunately,  our  data  does  not  allow
us to separate  the  effects  of a negative  determination  from  an agreement  among
the  parties  which  leads  to  withdrawal  from  the  investigation.  Prussa  (1989)  and
Staiger  and  Wolak (1990)  suggest  that  such  withdrawals  are the consequence  of
collusion  between domestic and foreign firms. Although this is a definite
possibility,  this paper presents  simpler  model which is consistent  with the
institutional  details.
Once  a  final  determination  has  been  reached,  a  firm  that  has  caused  material
injury  must  pay a duty on all imports  equal  to the dumping  or subsidy  margin.
A  year after  the  final  determination,  the  foreign  exporter  can  request  a review
4of the  case.  If  the  review  shows  that  the  firm  has  stopped  dumping  or receiving
a subsidy,  then the dumping  margin  is ievised to equal zero, but the order
remains.  If the  foreign  industry  dumps  the  following  year,  a new  dumping  margin
is assessed  and  duties  are collected  retroactively.  Consequently,  the foreign
firm is essentially  under the same penalty  scheme  once the duty is actually
imposed  as it  was  under  the investigation.
In this model, domestic  and foreign  firms produce thie  same homogeneous
product  and  en6age  in  Cournot  (quantity-setting)  behavior.  There  are  n domestic
and n* foreign  firms.  Each domestic  firm will maximize  the following  profit
function:
(1) p - P(Q)q - wq
Each domestic  firm produces  q, each foreign  exporter  sells q*,  and total  US
demand  is  given  by Q  - nq + n*q*.  Total  costs  wq for  domestic  firms  are  equal  to
input costs  w multiplied  by output  q. The technology  for both domestic  and
foreign  firms is constant  returns  to scale,  with no fixed  costs  and constar.e
marginal  costs.  This  assumption  is  necessary  for  identification  in  the  empirical
section  which  follows. 5
The foreign  firm  faces  a  slightly  different  maximization  problem.  We assume
that  the  foreign  firm  sets its  prices  separately  in its  home market  and the  US
market,  and  focus  only  on its  export  decision.  To capture  the  uncertainty  faced
by a foreign  firm under investigation  for dumping  or receiving  subsidies,  we
construct  the  following  expected  profit  function  for  its  export  sales:
5 See  Bresnahan  (1989)  for  a discussion  of the  identification  problem  in
measuring  market  power.
5(2) E(p*) - (l-g)[P(Q)]q*  +  g [P(Q) - (F - P(Q))]q* - ec*q*
The  probability  of a  duty  is  given  by g.  Expected  profits  are  a  weighted  average
of the firm's  profit  with and  without  duties.  If there  were no probability  of
a duty,  then (2)  would  be the  foreign  counterpart  of (1),  with foreign  costs
converted  into  dollars  by e, the  exchange  rate defined  as dollars  per unit of
foreign  currency.  We will  define  foreign  costs  c*e,  in dollars,  as w*.
If  the  duty  is imposed,  the  foreign  firm  will  have to  pay  a  per  unit fine
equal  to the  difference  between  the fair  price  F and the  price it charges,  P.
F will always  be greater  than  or equal to P, since the  foreign  firm has been
accused  of  pricing  too  low  in the  US market.  .r,  a dumping  case,  the fair  price
is generally  determined  L, the Department  of Commerce,  and defined "A  the
difference  between  the  foreign  home  market  price  and  the  exchange  rate-adjusted
import  price.  If sales in the  foreign  market  are below  cost,  ccnstructed  cost
estimates  are  found. Alternatively,  under  countervailing  duties  the  difference
F - P(Q)  can  also  be interpreted  as a  specific  duty equal  to the  amount  of the
subsidy  the  foreign  firm  receives.
It is  also  possible  that  firms  would  anticipate  an investigation  before
it is formally  announced.  If so,  then the impact  of an investigation  might  be
felt  prior  to  its  announcement.  In  the  empirical  section  which  follows,  however,
we test for  this  possibility  and  find  no evidence  of changed  behavior  prior  to
an investigation.
In  a Cournot  framework,  firms  choose  quantities  q and  q*.  Defining  foreign
costs  ec*  (in  dollars)  as  w*,  and  differentiating  (1)  and (2)  with respect  to  q
and  q* yields  the  first  order  conditions  for  profit  maximization:
6(3) dp/dq - P'(dQ/dq)q + P - w - 0
(4) d(E(p*))/dq* - g P'(dQ/dq*)q* + P'(dQ/dq*)q* + P + (g P) - Fg - w* - 0
Multiplying  (3)  by n and (4)  by n*, then  adding  the two  equations,  yields:
(5)  P'Q  + (n  + n*)P - nw + [n*  F(g/g+l)]  + (n*  w*/(g+l)]
Defining  the inverse  of the  elasticity  of demand  P'Q/P as l/e, this can be
rewritten  as
(5)' P( (1/c) + n + n*) - nw + fn*  F(g/g+l)] +  [n*  w*/(g+l)]
Recall  that  no optimizing  firm  in  a one  period  maximization  problem  will price
at less than marginal  cost, so P is greater than or equal to w*. But F is
greater  than  or equal  to  P  by definition,  so  F  2 w*.  We will  define  F as equal
to w*(M),  where  M is a mark-up  over  observed  costs  multiplied  by the  exchange
rate. In the  US case, F is usually  adjusted  to take into account  changes  in
foreign  costs  (either  due  to  changes  in  foreign-denominated  costs  or  the  exchange
rate). Equation  (5)'  may then  be rewritten  as:
(6)  P  [  (l/e)  + n  + n*]  - nw  +  n*w*  [  (  gM + 1 )/(g+l)  ]
As long as the  probability  of duty is greater  than 0 and the fair value F is
greater  than  w*,  the  firm's  mark-up  will  always  rise  under  an  investigation.  This
7may  be seen  by totally  differentiating  (6)  and  computing  the  total  derivatives
(dP/dM)(M/P)  and (dP/dg)(g/P):
n*w*(g/l  +  g) (M/P)
(7) (dP/dM)(M/P) -
(1/e) +  n +  n* -(P/P')(eQ/6 2)
W*(M-l)/(l+g)2
(8) (dP/dg)(g/P) -
(1/E)  +  n +  n* -(P/P')(EQ/E 2)
The  second  order  conditions  for  profit  maximization  imply  that  the  denominators
in (7) and (8) are positive.  Both numerators  are positive (recall  that M is
greater  than  or equal  to 1) so  both  expressions  are  positive.  Consequently,  we
would  expect  import  prices  to  rise  when  either  M  or  g  increases.  This  could  occu-
either  under  an investigation  (g  >  0  but  <  1)  or under  a  duty (g  - 1).  Clearly,
the  firm  must increase  its  price  to  compensate  for  the  probability  of  having  to
pay  the  (retroactive)  duty. However, (7)  and  (8)  show  that the  extent  to  which
prices  rise as M or g rise is also a function  of the  number  cf firms  and the
elasticity  of demand.  In  general, an increase  in  M or g  will not lead  to  a
one-for-one  increase  in price, in part because foreign costs are only one
component  of price  determination  (the  other  is  domestic  costs). Incorporating
non-constant  costs  will  also  change  the  pass-through  coefficient  on  H  and  g.  For
example,  if  costs  are  declining  then  it  is  possible  for  changes  in  M or g  to  be
magnified  (see  Feenstra  (1989)).
One  of  the  shortcomings  of a  one-period  maximization  problem  is that  firms
must  price  greater  than  or  equal  to  marginal  cost  in  each  period.  Consequently,
in this  model  the  definition  of dumping  can  only  be taken  to  mean pricing  below
8what  the  firm  sets  in  its  home  market.  This  is  a  standard  definition  of  dumping:
the sale of the same good  at different  prices  in the  home and export  market.
Although  tt  definition  of  dumping  has sometimes  been  exten-led  to include  sales
below short run marginal  cost, in our simple  model this type of behavior  is
ignored.
This framework,  which is  consistent  with institutional  details,  suggests
that import  prices  should  rise  under  an investigation.  The impact  of a duty  on
prices  is  also incorporated  in  the  framework  above:  the  only  difference  is  that
the  probability  g  rises  to  100  percent.  This  model  also  implies  that  prices  are
likely  to rise more for products  where the probability  of a duty is higher.
Although  we canimot  measure  such  probabilities  ex ante, one  ex post  indication
of higher  probabilities  is  whether  or not a duty  was actually  imposed.  In our
model,  the  price  effect  of an investigation  is likely  to be greater  for  those
goods where the investigation  ends in an affirmative  decision  and a duty is
consequently  imposed.  This result  contrasts  with Prussa  (1989)  and Staiger  and
Wolak  (1990),  who  suggest  that  prices  should  increase  more (or  decline  less)  for
goods  where  duties  are  not  imposed.  In  these  models,  successful  collusion  between
exporters  and  domestic  producers  leads  to  a  withdrawal  of the  investigation  and
increasing  or  stabilized  import  prices. The  different  outcomes  predicted  by the
two  models  are  tested  using  the  empirical  specification  described  below.
III.  Empirical  Specification  and  Data
The empirical  specification  is der'ved  directly  from the reduced form,
equation  (6).  Rewriting  (6)  yields:
9(9)  P (  (1/e)  + n + n*]  - n*w* [  (nw/n*w*)  + (gK  + l)/(g+l)
Adding  and  subtracting  1 from  the  right-hand  side,  (9)  may  be rewritten  as
(10)  P (  (1/c)  + n + n*]  n*w* [  (nw/n*w*)  + g(M-l)/(g+l)  + 1
Taking  logs  and  rearranging  yields:
(11) LogP -
logw*  + log[(nw/n*w*) + g(M-l)/(g+l) + 1]  + log [n*/((l/e) + n + n*)]
The  second  term  of the  right-hand  side  may  be rewritten  using  the  approximation
that the  log(l  + x) - x.  The last  term in equation  (11)  is the  mark-up  over
marginal  cost for  a  non-competitive  firm.  We will assume  that  this  mark-up  has
a time  varying  component  yt  as well as an industry-specific  component  fi  which
is  constant  over time  but  varies  across  each  ith industry The industry  effect
will  be incorporated  using  industry  dummy  variables,  while time  effects  will  be
controlled  for  using  time  dummies  for  each  quarter.  Introducing  subscripts  i  for
the ith  sector  and t for  the  time  period,  (11)  can  be written  as
(12)  LogPit  - logw*j  + (n/n*)(w/w*),t  + g(M-l)/(g+l) 1 t +  f 1 + Y,
The  third  term  on the  right  hand  side  is the  price  increase  arising  from  either
an investigation  (g  < 1)  or a  duty (g  - 1),  This  term  will  be denoted  by a  dummy
variable  INV  or DLT.,.  The final  estimating  equation  is given  by
10(13)  LogPt - allogw*it  +  a2 (W/W*)it  +  a3INVLt  + a4DUTYjt  +f,  +  y,
A  number  of  implications  arise  from  the  reduced  form  (13).  First,  the  coefficient
on  w* should  be equal  to  1.  Second,  the  coefficient  on  w/w*,  INV  andl  DUTY  should
be positive.  Third,  the  coefficient  on DUTY  should  be greater  than  or equal  to
the  coefficient  on INV.
The  supply  relation  (13)  is  identified  using  two  key  assumptions.  First,  we
assume that the technology  is characterized  by constant  marginal costs.  The
marginal  cost  curve,  which  is  flat,  only  shifts  if input  prices  or the  exchange
rate  move,  which  is  capture-  by  w*.  Second,  we assume  that  changes  in the  number
of firms  or in the elasticity  of demand  may be captured  by industry  and time
dummies.  These assumptions  together  allow us to exclude quantity  and income
variables  on the  right  hand  side  of (]3).  Quantity  measures  at the  4-digit  SITC
level  were  not  available  for  imports  to test  the  accuracy  of the  specification.
One  modification  which  could  be desirable  in future  research  would  be to make
either  marginal  costs  or the  demand  elasticity  explicitly  a function  of output
indices.  It  is  possible  that  omitting  changes  in  output,  which  cannot  be  captured
by industry  or time  effects,  bias  the  results.  For  example,  if increased  output
is  associated  with  falling  prices  and  higher  likelihood  of  an  investigation,  then
the  coefficient  on investigations  will  be biased  downwards.
Data
Equation (13) is estimated using quarterly data for  1981-1986 for 41
industries.  The price variable  logP is taken from the BLS import  price index
series  which  calculates  import  price  indices  for  industries  at the  4-digit  SITC
11(Revision  2)  level.  The  price  series  is  calculated  based  on  a  survey  of  wholesale
prices  for imports  in the  United  States.  Since  the  BLS price i.ndices  control
for  quality  changes,  these  indices  are  likely  to  be superior  to  unit  price  data,
which  may  exhibit  fluctuations  due  to changes  in  quality.
One of the  dataset's  limitations  is that it does not specify  the  amount
of  the  duty  imposed.  Consequently,  we  cannot  estimate  the  amount  which  was  passed
on to the  buyer.  However,  since  the  import  price  data  are taken  from  wholesale
buyers  of  imported  products,  the  import  price  series  should  incorporate  the  price
effects  of  the  duties.  Another  potential  estimation  issue  arises  from  specifying
a  duty  or investigation  as  0 or 1,  which  introduces  a classic  measurement  error
problem. As  with  all such  problems,  it is  possible  to show  that  this  will lead
to underestimating  the  true value of  the coefficients on INV  and  DUTY.
Consequently,  these coefficients  should  be interpreted  as a lower  bound for
measuring  the  effect  of LFV  cases  on import  prices.
Exchange  rates  were calculated  using  bilateral  nominal  rates  weighted  by
1980  trade  volumes  for  each  4-digit  SITC  category.  Foreign  wholesale  prices  at
the aggregate  level,  which we used as a measure of factor  costs in foreign
currency,  were  also  calculated  using  1980  trade  weights  and  wholesale  prices  from
the  International  Monetary  Fund.  Non-tariff  barrier  data is taken  from  UNCTAD,
which collects  data on non-tariff  barriers  for most developed  countries.  The
United  States  NTB data was collected  at the  US tariff  code (TSUSA)  level  and
aggregated  to the  4-digit  SITC  level  using  a concordance  made available  by the
ITC.  6  Since  the  UNCTAD  database  only contains  information  on  whether  or not
6  When several  tariff  categories  were  merged  into  one  4-digit  SITC  code,
if  one  LFV  case  was  associated  with  any  one  of  the  TSUSA  categories  then  the  SITC
category  was considered  as subject  to a LFV casa. It can be shown that the
measurement  error  which  follows  from this  concordance  leads  to  underestimating
12an investigation  or duty  was  applied,  the  variable  NTB  only  takes  on a  value  of
1 or 0.  In future  research  efforts,  the  UNCTAD  database  could  be replaced  by
a more comprehensive  datas-t  with additional  information  on the value  I  the
preliminary  dumping/subsidy  margin  or the  value  of the  final  duty imposed.
The  41 industry  sample  was  selected  by drawing  only  complete  price  series
from the  BLS import  price  series,  which is available  at the  4-digit  level  for
selected  SITC categories  and selected  years. For 1981-1986,  a complete  time
series  was available  for  60 SITC  groups.  The frequency  and types  of non-tariff
barriers  across  these  categories  are shown  in Table  1. The frequency  measure
simply  records  the  number  of times  a particular  NTB appeared  in the database,
and  reflects  the  number  of  countries  affected  as  well  as the  number  of different
instances  each  measure  was  applied  over  1981-1986.
Table 1 shows  that  quotas  and  voluntary  export  restraints  were the  most
prevalent  type  of  NTB  applied.  In  next  order  of importance  were investigations,
which accounted  for over 30 % of all non-tariff  barrier cases. These were
followed  by duties,  which  represented  12 % of all  NTBs.  LFV  cases  represented
an important  type  of  non-tariff  barrier  for  the  sample  industries.
To  ensure  that  we  would  not  confuse  the  effect  of  a  countervailing  or  anti-
dumping  duty  with  other  NTBs,  all industries  subject  to any  of the  other  types
of non-tariff  barriers  were excluded  from the  sample.  This reduced  the sample
from 60 to 45 industries.  Most of the SITC categories  eliminated  were steel
products,  which have  been subject  to multiple  NTBs (such  as voluntary  export
restraints  and  trigger  prices)  in the  1980s.  The  sample  was further  reduced  to
41 sectors,  eliminating  products  with insufficient  observations  to provide  a
the  impact  of LFV  cases.
13Table  1
Frequency  of Non-tariff  barriers
1981-1986
Non-tariff  barrier  Frequency  Percent
Tariff  with quota  2  0.1
Seasonal  Specific  Tariffs  3  0.2
Investigations  655  36.1
Duties  226  12.5
Specific  taxes  53  2.9
Quotas (including  VRAs)  825  45.4
Price  monitoring  4  0.2
Trigger  price  mechanism  3  0.6
Voluntary  export  price  restraint  11  0.6
Multi-Fibre  Agreement  23  1.3
Other  4  0.2
Source:  UNCTAD  database.
control  group  within  each  1-digit  SITC  category.  LFV  cases  were  imposed  on  about
half of the  remaining  41 sectors  over 1981-86. Since  the  time  series  runs  from
the first  quarter of 1981 to the last quarter  of 1986, the total number of
observations  is  equal  to 984.
Sample  means  for  the  dataset  are listed  in Table  2. The price,  cost,  and
exchange rate indices  were set at 100 for the first quarter of 1981, the
beginning  of the sample  period.  Table  2 shows that the  mean import  price  was
almost  constant  over the sample  period,  falling  slightly  below its beginning
level.  The  exchange  rate,  denominated  in  dollars  per  unit of foreign  currency,
appreciated  significantly.  Import prices did not fall with the dollar's
appreciation,  but remained  steady,  which  suggests  that the  pass-through  of the
exchange  rate to prices  was minimal.  However,  foreign  ccsts (proxied  by the
14foreign  wholesale price index) rose over the  period, perhaps partly due to the
depreciation  of  various  currencies  vis-a-vis  the  dollar.  These increases  in  costs
may  have offset  the  fall in  import  prices  expected  under the  dollar  depreciation.
The combined cost index, w*, shows that the net impact of exchange rate and
foreign  cost changes  was  an overall fall in dollar-denominated  foreign costs.
Table 2:  Sample  Means
Variable  Mean
Import Price  97.14
(8.68)
Exchange  Rate e  84.29
(9.83)











The  means  for  investigations INV  and  duties  DUTY  show  the  average
proportion  of  sectors  subject  to  investigations and  duties  over  1981-86.
Investigations for subsidies or dumping were  imposed for 13 percent of the
sample.  Duties were applied  over 14 % of the sample.
15IV.  Results
Figure  I  shows  a separate  plot  for  each  of the  4-digit  categories
subject  to  either  an investigation  or duty.  The import  price  for  the  affected
sector  is  graphed  against  the  price  trend  for  a  control  group.  The  control  group
is  calculated  as  the  arithmetic  average  of import  prices  for  all  sectors  within
the  same I  digit  SITC  category  not  affected  by non-tariff  barriers.  A control
group  is  omitted  only  for  'softwood  lumber* due  to lack  of comparable  sectors
within  the  same  1-digit  category.  Softwood  lumber  is  also  excluded  from  the  rest
of  the  analysis  but  is  included  in  the  graphic  presentation  because  the  pricing
response  was so dramatic  to the initiation  of an investigation.  The first
vertical  bar  in  the  plots  from  Figure  1  signal  the  beginning  of  an  investigation;
if  a duty  was  imposed,  this  is  indicated  by a second  vertical  bar.
The  plots  in  figure  1  are  striking  in  two  respects. First,  the  plots  show
that  on  average  import  prices  responded  to  the  initiation  of  investigations.  The
most  striking  examples  are  softwood  lumber,  wood  products,  appliances  for  liquid
flow  control,  men's  shirts,  and knitted  sweaters.  For both men's shirts  and
knitted  sweaters,  it  appears  that  almost  all  of the  price  increase  had  already
occurred  by the  time  the  duty  was  imposed.  Second,  import  prices  respond  quite
differently  across  sectors.  In  machinery  (for  example,  roller  bearings  and  motor
vehicle  parts)  the impact  of LFV  cases  seems  much less significant  than for
garments  (see,  for  example,  men's  shirts  and  knitted  sweaters)
In  other  sectors  where  prices  may  not  have actually  increased  under  the
investigation,  the  initiation  of a LFV  case  seems  to  have  prevented  a decline
in  import  prices  either  apparent  in  the  earlier  trend  or in  the  behavior  of  the
control  group.  This  was  the  case  for  toys  and  games,  sporting  goods,  plastic
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Table 3  calculates  the means of prices  by commodity  group before  and
during  the investigations.  We exclude  the  period  following  the investigation,
since  in a number  of cases  duties  were consequently  imposed.  Prices  generally
rose under  an investigation,  although  on average  the  price increase  is quite
small.  However,  when the  change  in prices  is  compared  with price  trends  for  a
control  group  over  the  same  period,  the  price  increase  appears  more  significant.  7
On average,  import  prices  for  the  control  group  generally  fell  during  the  same
period.  The price  changes  following  the investigations  were compared  to price
changes  for  the  control  group  and  the  mean  difference  in  price  movements  for  the
two  groups  was  compared  using  a t-test.  The  means  test  in  Table  3 shows  that  the
increase  in  prices  under an investigation  is statistically  significant  at the
5 percent  level.  The  means  presented  above  give  preliminary  evidence  that  an
investigation  does  increase the  import price of a  product. In addition,
comparisons  with a control group suggest that the price increase is more
significant  when compared  to general  trends  in the  import  price  level.
The impact  of duties  on import  prices  is evaluated  in  Table  4. Excluding
the  periods  under investigation,  we compare  pricing  behavior  with and without
the duty.  As indicated  by the  mean price changes  for the control group,  the
overall  price  level  was  rising  when  most  duties  were  actually  in  place.  Hcwever,
prices  for  goods  witn  duties  rose  even  higher,  indicating  a  net  positive  impact
of  duties  on import  prices.  The  t-st.tistic  for  the  difference  in  prices  pre  and
post duty is  significant  at the  10  percent  level.
Although  the  plots  in Figure  1 and  the  means  presented  in Tables  3  and  4
7  Again,  the  control  group  includes  all  4-digit  SITC  categories  within  the
same 1-digit  SITC category,  averaged  over the relevant  time  period  before  and
during  the  investigation.
20Table 3  Impact of Investigations on Import Prices: Industry Means
SITC  Description  Investigation  Control Group
Pre  Post  Dif  Pre  Post  Dif
2482  Softwood Lumber  1/  96.6  107.1  10.5  98.2  96.7  -1.5
6359  Wood Products  104.7  103.6  -1.1  105.3  102.6  -2.7
6822  Copper/Alloys, Worked  91.8  90.3  -1.6  102.8  103.0  0.2
6991  Locksmith's wares  98.0  101.0  3.1  103.8  113.2  9.4
of base metal
7452  Packaging, weighing  91.4  85.7  -5.7  97.4  93.5  -3.9
non-elec machinery
7491  Roller bearings  96.4  93.4  -3.0  95.2  93.2  -2.0
7492  Appliances for  97.4  98.2  0.8  95.9  92.4  -3.5
liquid flow control
7781  Batteries  97.0  91.6  -5.4  100.0  93.0  -7.0
7788  Misc elec machinery  96.3  92.6  -3.8  97.8  94.1  -3.7
8421  Woven coats, men's  100.3  101.6  1.3  92.9  87.0  -5.9
8423  Woven pants, men's  100.5  98.4  -2.2  92.9  87.0  -4.0
8441  Woven shirts, men's  102.7  114.1  11.4  92.9  87.0  -4.0
8451  Knitted sweaters  98.2  105.0  6.8  92.9  87.0  -4.0
8482  Plastic/Rubber  99.1  97.7  -1.3  94.5  86.3  -8.2
apparel
8942  Toys and games  100.2  100.6  0.4  96.8  91.6  -5.2
8947  Sporting goods  98.9  97.3  -1.6  96.8  91.6  -5.2
Sample Mean  97.6  98.6  1.0  97.3  93.7  -3.6
T-Test of Difference in  Means  Difference  4.1
T-valuc  2.7
1/ Since no other products available in SITC 2, all products used as control.
21Table  4
Impact  of Duties  on Import  Prices:
Industry  Means
SITC  Description  Duty  Control  Group
Pre  Post  Dif  Pre  Post  Dif
6861  Zinc  and  alloys  95.9  104.1  8.2  108.4  103.3  -5.1
7452  Packaging,  weighing  91.4  94.4  3.0  97.4  93.9  -3.5
non-elec  machinery
7492  Appliances  for liquid  97.4  111.4  14.0  95.9  94.7  -1.2
flow  control
7722  Printed  circuit  boards  94.2  98.2  4.0  94.3  98.1  3.8
7788  Misc electric  machinery  96.3  90.2  -6.1  97.8  93.7  -4.1
8421  Woven  coats,  men's  100.3  101.2  0.9  92.9  100.7  7.8
8423  Woven  pants,  men's  100.5  102.4  1.9  92.9  100.7  7.8
8441  Woven  shirts,  men's  102.7  122.7  20.1  92.9  100.7  7.8
8451  Knitted  sweaters  98.2  119.0  20.8  92.9  100.7  7.8
8942  Toys  and  games  100.2  98.1  -2.1  96.8  92.9  -3.9
8947  Sporting  goods  98.9  93.8  -5.1  96.8  92.9  -3.9
Sample  97.2  103.5  6.3  96.3  97.5  1.2
Mean
T-Test  of Difference  Difference  4.2
in  Means  T-value  1.7
22suggest  that  both investigations  and  dutieu  have  a significant  effect  on import
prices,  these exercises  cannot  control  for  other  factors  such  as exchange  rate
and  cost changes.  The  remainder  of this  paper  tests  the  effects  of LFV  cases
using  a number  of alternative  empirical  specifications.  We begin  with a simple
OLS specification,  controlling  for industry-specific  effects.  Since exchange
rate  and  cost  changes  may  only  be gradually  passed  on to import  prices,  we then
introduce lagged price on  the right-hand side. Finally, we  consider the
possibility  of  sample  selection  bias.  Since  LFV  cases  may  occur  in  specific  types
of  sectors, such  as  those  experiencing rapid  price  declines prior  to
investigations,  it  is important  to test  for  the  impact  of  selection  bias on the
estimated  coefficients.
Table 5 presents  OLS estimates  for equation  (13) using a fixed effect
specification.  Dummy  variables  are included  to control  fer industry  effects.
Since  the earlier  plots  and tables  suggested  that behavior  may differ  across
different  sectors,  we divide the sample  into three groups and estimate  the
coefficients separately for  SITC  6  (intermediate  manufactures), SITC.  7
(machinery),  and  SITC  8  (other  manufactures).  Time  dummies  were included  for  each
of the  24 quarters  but the  coefficients  are  not reported  here.
Three  different  specifications  are  included  for  each sector.  Since  there
is likely  to  be multicollinearity  between  logw*  and the  relative  cost  variable
w/w*, specifications  (1)  and (2)  exclude  w/w*.  We also  allow  the coefficient
on INV to differ  depending  on whether the outcome is affirmative  (a duty is
imposed)  or  negative  (no  duty).  The  model  presented  earlier  suggested  that  the
price  effect  of investigations  should  vary  as the  probability  of  a  duty  changed.
Consequently,  if firms  have prior  knowledge  on the likelihood  of a duty (as
proxied here by the ex post outcome) this should affect the impact  of an
23investigation.
For all three manufacturing  groups, duties lead to a  statistically
significant  increase  in  import  prices,  ranging  from  4 to  9  percent.  However,  the
impact of  investigations  varies significantly  across  the  three sectors.
Investigations  have no impact  on prices for machinery  imports (SITC 7),  but
statistically  significant  and  opposite  effects  in SITC 6 (intermediates)  and  8
(textiles).
When the  impact  of an investigation  is  separately  estimated  depending  on
whether  the investigation  is followed  by a duty, several  interesting  results
emerge.  For intermediates  (SITC  6), investigations  have no impact  on import
prices unless chey end in a duty: when a duty follows, investigations  are
accompanied  by (on average)  13 percent  price declines.  For SITC 7, neither
investigations  nor  duties  have  a  statistically  significant  impact  on  prices.  For
SITC  8,  however,  the  impact  of an investigation  is  greatest  for  investigations
culminating  in duties, indicating  that the expected  duty is incorporated  in
pricing  behavior  before  the  duty  is  actually  imposed. Investigations  resulting
in  a duty  have a positive  price  effect  roughly  equivalent  to the  duty itself,
raising prices in the 4-digit SITC category  by about 6  %.  Investigations
resulting  in no action  also lead  to price increases,  but the  magnitude  of the
increase  is smaller.
The behavior  of sectors  within SITC 8 provides support for the model
presented  earlier,  which  suggested  that  both investigations  and  duties  would  be
accompanied  by price increases.  The model  also suggested  that  price increases
during  an investigation  would  be  highest  where  the  likelihood  of  duties  was  also
greatest.  In Table 6, investigations  which  culminated  in duties  also had the
greatest  positive  impact  on prices  for  SITC  8. However,  the  evidence  for
24Table  5
OLS ESTIMATES  OF IMPORT  PRICE  EQUATION
INCLUDING  FIXED  EFFECTS
Dependent  variable: Log  P
SITC  6  SITC  7  SITC  8
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
Intercept  3.306  3.387  -5.881  2.287  2.290  -4.132  2.613  2.607  -9.151
(.440)  (.429) (4.050)  (.250)  (.251) (1.874)  (.289)  (.289) (3.269)
Investigation  -.058  - - -.001  - - .055
(.021)  (.010)  (.010)
Duty  .050  .085  .078  .038  .038  .039  .053  .053  .056
(.020)  (.022)  (.023)  (.008)  (.009)  (.008)  (.01')  (.011)  (.011)
Investigation  - -. 138  -.126  - -.005  -.003  - .058  .062
(Duty)  (.032)  (.033)  (.013)  (.013)  (.011)  (.011)
Investigation  -.006  0.000  - .003  .002  - .029  .045
(No  duty)  (.026)  (.026)  (.014)  (.014)  (.027)  (.027)
Log  w*  .283  .263  1.958  .512  .511  1.679  .438  .439  2.580
(.091)  (.734)  (.054)  (.054)  (.341)  (.063)  (.063)  (.596)
W/w*  1.478  1.040  1.911
(.661)  (.304)  (.521)
R2  .58  .60  .58  .74  .74  .74  .74  .74
N  192  192  192  480  480  480  312  312
Note:  All  equations  include  quarterly  time  dummies.intermediate  manufactures  (SITC  6)  seems  to  provide  more  support  for  the  models
developed  by Prussa  (1988)  and Staiger  and Wolak (1990).  For intermediat.es,
prices  only  fell  when  investigations  were followed  by duties,  while  prices  were
maintained  when the investigation  failed  to culminate  in the imposition  of a
duty.  As suggested  by Prussa's (1988) theoretical  model, it appears that
importers  which fail to curb  price  declines  are "punished"  with duties,  while
those  which  stabilize  price  levels  are rewarded  by zero duties.  The types  of
products  subject to LFV cases in SITC 6, such as metal and wood products,
typically  have a more concentrated  market structure than those in SITC 8
(primarily garments).  Since price collusion is  likely to be  easier in
concentrated  markets, it is not surprising  that intermediates  provide more
support  for  the  theoretical  framework  suggested  in  Prussa  (1988),  while  garment
exporters  seem  to  follow  more  closely  the  noncooperative  framework  in  this  paper.
One of the implications  of the  model is that the  coefficient  on foreign
costs  (in  dollar  terms)  should  be  equal  to  unity.  When  w/w*  is  excluded  from  the
equation,  the  coefficient  on log  w* is  significantly  lower  than  unity,  while  if
w/w* is included,  the  estimates  on log  w* range from  1.7 to 2.6. It is likely
that  inclusion  of  w/w*  makes  it  difficult  to estimate  the  coefficient  on log  w*
precisely  due  to  multicollinearity  between  the  two  variables.  Although  including
w/w* or excluding  it has no impact  on the  other  variables  of interest,  it is
disturbing  that the estimate  on log  w* is so low  when w/w* is excluded.  One
possible  explanation  for  this  low  value  is  that  we are  not  accounting  for  lagged
effects.  Exchange  rate  and  cost  changes  may only  slowly  translate  into  changes
in  import  prices,  possibly  due  to  contracts  which  make  price  adjustments  sticky.
Table  6  re-estimates  the import  price  equation  under  the  assumption  of a
geometrically  declining  lag  on all the ri&ht-hand  side independent  variables.
26Table 6
ALTERNATIVE  SPECIFICATION  ALLOWING
FOR  ADJUSTMENT  LAGS
Dependent  variable: Log  P
ImDlied  long  run  coefficients
SITC  6  SITC  7  SITC  8  SITC  6  SITC 7  SITC  8
Intercept  1.141  -.147  -.002  - - -
(.370)  (.153)  (.184)
Lag P  .711  .876  .848  - - -
(.056)  (.027)  (.033)
Investigation  -.040  .004  .014  -.140  .031  .095
(Duty)  (.024)  (.007)  (.006)
Investigation  .008  .003  .009  .027  .027  .061
(No  duty)  (.018)  (.008)  (.014)
Duty  .034  .009  -.011  .118  .075  -.072
(.016)  (.005)  (.006)
Log  w*  .044  .155  .152  .152  1.252  0.998
(.071)  (.032)  (.036)
F-Test (a)  9.5  0.9  0.0  - - -
R2 .85  .94  .93
N  184  460  299  - - -
Standard  errors  in ().
Dummy  variables  included  for  each  four-digit  SITC code  to control  for
industry  fixed  effects. All  equations  also include  quarterly  time  dummies.
(a)  F - value for  the  test  that  the  long  run  coefficient  on Log  w* - 1.Including  the lagged import price on the right-hand side is equivalent  to
including  lags  on  all  the  independent  variables.  The  long-run  coefficient  on the
exogenous  variables  is  then  equal  to  the  estimated  coefficient  divided  by 1  minus
the  coefficient  on lagged  price.  (An  alternative  specification  would  be to
explicitly  include  lagged  values  for selected  variables  and add the  values  to
derive  a long  run  value).  Table  6  shows  that  the  long  run coefficient  for  w* is
not statistically  different  from  unity for  all sectors  in SITC 7 and 8. This
suggests  that  the  model  specification  is  supported  for  those  sectors,  but  at the
same time indicates  that the results in SITC 6 should  be interpreted  with
caution.
Another potential bias from estimating (13) lies in the  fact that
investigations  and duties  may not be an exogenous  event.  Salvatore (1987)
suggests  that investigations  (and  duties)  are  more likely  to  be initiated  when
import  penetration  is high,  while  others  have argued  that  rising  protection  in
the  early 1980s  was related  the significant  appreciation  of the  US dollar.  If
investigations  and duties  are in fact endogeneous  with respect to imports  or
exchange  rate changes, then the previous  estimates  may be biased.  If the
likelihood  of  an  investigation  is  greater  when  import  penetration  is  high,  import
prices  are  low,  or the  exchange  rate  is  appreciating,  then  earlier  estimates  of
the  price  effects  of LFV  cases  will  be biased  downwards.
We first test for the presence  of selection  bias by creating  a dummy
variable  which equals 1 if an investigation  will occur one, two, or three
quarters  later.  The coefficient  on the  dummy  variable  should  be zero if there
is  no selection  bias.  If there  is  an  endogeneity  problem,  the  value  of the  dummy
variable  could  be positive,  suggesting  that  suppliers  know the  government
watching.  Alternatively,  it could show up negative if falling import  prices
28Table  7
TESTING  FOR  SAMPLE  SELECTION  BIAS
Dependent  variable: Log  P
SITC  6  SITC  7  SITC  8
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Lead 1 Inv.  -.001  - -.019  - .017
(.044)  (.042)  (.050)
Lead 2 Inv.  .023  - -.021  - .019
(.044)  (.042)  (.050)
Lead 3 Inv.  .005  .003  -.020  -.018  .026  .024
(.045)  (.044)  (.042)  (.041)  (.050)  (.050)
Investigation  -.135  -.138  -.006  -.005  .058  .058
(Duty)  (.034)  (.033)  (.013)  (.013)  (.011)  (.011)
Investigation  -.006  -.006  .003  .003  .029  .029
(No  duty)  (.026)  (.026)  (.014)  (.014)  (.027)  (.027)
Duty  .085  .085  .036  .037  .054  0.053
(.022)  (.022)  (.009)  (.009)  (.011)  (.011)
Log  w*  .267  .264  .512  .511  .436  .438
(.092)  (.092)  (.055)  (.055)  (.063)  (.063)
R2  .59  .60  .74  .74  .73  .74
N  192  192  480  480  312  312
All equations  include  time and  industry  dummies.
Intercept  term  included  but not reported.
Lead  1 Inv.  - dummy  variable  equal  to 1 for  one quarter  before  investigation
begins.
Lead 2 Inv.  - dummy  variable  equal  to 1 for  two  quarters  before  investigation
begins.
Lead 3  Inv.  - dummy  variable  equal  to  1 for  three  quarters  before  investigation
begins.trigger  an investigation.  The  results  for  this  exercise  are  presented  in Table
7.  The  dummy  variables  which  test  for  sample  selection  bias  are  all  statistically
insignificant,  which suggests  that the bias due to sample selection is not
important.  The  results  in  Table  7  provide  support  for  the  appropriateness  of the
control  group;  if differences  existed  between  the two groups,  these  should  be
reflected  in the  coefficients  on the  dummies  preceding  the  investigations.
Despite  the evidence  presented  in Table  7 that sample  selection  bias is
probably  not a serious  problem  for the estimation  procedure,  we nevertheless
estimated (13) taking into account  the potential endogeneity  of duties and
investigations.  Table 8 presents  the results  from two-stage  least  squares  of
estimation  ef (13). Investigations  and  duties  are  estimated  in  the  first  stage
using  as instruments  lagged  changes  in  price  and  foreign  costs  logw*,  the  lagged
share  of the  4-digit  sector  in total  US imports,  and the  other  right-hand  side
exogenous  variables  in the equation.  One limitation,  however,  was that the
available  instruments  did  not allow  us to estimate  with  precision  the  price
effects  of investigations  which resulted  in duties  from  others  which did  not.
Consequently,  only the simpler specification  (with just one variable for
investigations)  is presented  in Table 8. The  predicted  values  from the  linear
probability  model  are then  used in the  second  stage.  This  procedure  is simpler
than  using  a  Heckman  two-stage  sample  selection  procedure.  Such  an approach  was
employed  in  an  earlier  version  of this  paper  and  did  not  yield  different  results
than  two  stage  least  squares.
Table 8 yields qualitatively  similar  results  to the OLS specifications
presented  earlier,  although  some  interesting  differences  emerge.  The impact  of
duties is stati-tically  insignificant  for SITCs 7 and 8, but  increases  in
magnitude  for  SITC  6. For  intermediates,  the  two-stage  results  suggest  that
30Table 8
INSTRUMENTAL  VARIABLE  ESTIMATES  a/
Dependent  variable:  Log  P
SITC 6  SITC 7  SITC 8
Intercept  4.056  1.541  3.701
(.958)  (.142)  (.856)
Investigation  -/ .484  -. 075  .191
(.260)  (.034)  (.088)
Duty k/  .353  -.012  .030
(.180)  (.017)  (.038)
Log  w*  .129  .673  .195
(.203)  (.031)  (.190)
.33  .66  .61
N  192  480  312
a/  All equations include time and intercept dummies.
~/  Instruments include lagged changes in  price and Log w*, lrelw, the lagged
share of  the sector  in total  imports, log w*,  and  time  and  industry
dummies.prices  rose  by 35 % with the imposition  of a duty.  For all three  groups  of
manufactures,  the impact  of investigations  is statistically  significant.  For
SITCs  6  and  7,  investigations  are  associated  with  statistically  significant  price
declines,  while  for  SITC  8  the  price  effect  is  positive,  suggesting  a  19 %  price
increase  under investigations.
Conclusion
This  paper measures the  impact of  anti-dumping and  countervailing
investigations  and duties  on import  prices  in the  United  States  over 1981-86.
Our results  suggest  that import  prices  increasad  by as much as 10 percent  for
some manufacturing  sectors (such  as garments)  during an investigation.  This
confirms  that  these  measures  do exert  a significant  protective  effect  through
import  prices,  even  apart  from  the  actual  imposition  of  duties.  The  panel  nature
of  the  dataset  makes  it  possible  to  control  both  for  industry  effects  and  general
trends  in  import  prices,  as r;ll  as  obtain  separate  estimates  of the  price  impact
of investigations  and  duties.
The results  also suggest  that investigations  followed  by duties have
different  effects  than those  resulting  in no action.  For all three  groups  of
manufacturing  sectors  studied  in  the  paper,  investigations  ending  in  no duty  had
almost  no impact  on import  prices.  However,  investigations  followed  by duties
were accompanied  by either significant  price increases  (as in textiles)  or
declines.  For intermediate  goods,  investigations  which ended in duties  were
accompanied  by price  declines  as  high as 15 %.  These  different  results  suggest
that  the  price  dynamics  across  industries  is likely  to  vary significantly.  For
textiles, ret:roactive  duties appear to have been  anticipated during the
32investigation  and incorporated  in pricing  behavior.  For the other sectors,
including  intermediates  and  machinery,  duties  appear  to follow  as a punishment
for  a fall in import  prices.
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